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COMMENTS
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PROMOTERS TO THE
CORPORATION FOR PROFITS
The Washington cases involving the question of the corporation's
right of action against promoters who reap secret profits, do not yet
cover the complete scope of legal principles developed on this sub-
ject. The cases state general conclusions and are inadequately dis-
cussed. In order that the Washington cases may be better evaluated,
a brief summary of the general rules as applied in other jurisdic-
tions, will first be presented.
A common rationalization is used for deciding most of the cases;
namely, whether under the facts and circumstances of a particular
case, it can be said that the corporation had knowledge of, or
assented to, the overvaluation. The two real landmark cases, Old
Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn et al,1
and Old Dominion Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow,2 differ in the
application of this test. The Lewisohn case, known as the U. S.
view, holds that the corporation has a right of action against pro-
moters who sell property to it, greatly overvalued, if the sale was
made at a time when the promoters owned all the issued shares of
the corporation-even though there is an intention to invite the
public to subscribe for part of the original shares. The U. S.
Supreme Court rationalized their holding by saying that the cor-
poration assented to the transaction with full knowledge of the
facts by all those concerned in it; and, therefore, the corporation
was not damaged. The Bigelow case, known as the Massachusetts
view, holds that when subsequent shareholders are contemplated,
the promoter is liable to the corporation by virtue of his fiduciary
relation, because the corporate entity's assent, having been given
by a non-independent board of directors, was invalid. England and
the great weight of authority in the U. S.1 are in accord with the
Bigelow case. The Massachusetts view seems better, because it
serves more efficiently to prevent the use of corporate organiza-
tions as instruments of fraud in deceiving the public, since there
seems to be no reason for overvaluing property unless the issue of
shares to the public is intended; because it prevents a multiplicity
of suits by allowing the corporation to sue in place of all the
individual shareholders; and, finally, because it enables individuals,
who might not otherwise be in a position to afford the costs and
expenses of litigation, to secure redress.
When the set-up is similar to the Dominion cases, but the promo-
tion plan does not contemplate the issuance of any shares by the
corporation to innocent outsiders, and there is no intention to
invite the public to subscribe for shares; the English and American
courts uniformly deny a recovery to the corporation.'
1210 U. S. 206, 28 Sup. Ct. 634, 52 L. ed. 1025 (1907).
2188 Mass. 315, 74 N. E. 653 (1905).
385 A. L. R. 1276; BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, (1927) § 50 at
180.
'85 A. L. R. 1273; BALLANTINE, OP. cit. supra, note 3, § 50 at 176.
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In a third class of cases where there are innocent shareholders
at the time the promoters obtain their secret profits, again knowl-
edge and assent are important factors. The courts here uniformly
grant a recovery to the corporation, 5 on the basis of fraud, since
disclosure of the secret profit was made only to the group in con-
trol. Fraud may never be perpetrated on a minority in a corpora-
tion, so that even if there is one innocent, existing shareholder,
the corporation will recover."
There is a fourth group of cases, where the promoters subscribe
to all of the authorized shares, and then sell their own shares on the
market, without disclosure of their large gains. Here, again, on the
theory that all the original subscribers have assented to the trans-
action, the corporation is denied recovery.7 This result seems
contrary to the Massachusetts view, because, unquestionably, sub-
sequent shareholders were contemplated. Furthermore, this result
seems to be one of form rather than substance, and it merely
allows the shrewd promoter to utilize a convenient device to cir-
cumvent the law.
A fifth group of cases occurs where, with future innocent share-
holders being contemplated, the promoter subscribes to all of the
authorized shares, and, pursuant to a pre-incorporation scheme,
donates some of the shares back to the corporation to be sold as
treasury stock. By throwing aside this subterfuge; the corpora-
tion should recover on an analogy to the Massachusetts view. How-
ever, unfortunately, there is a conflict of authority here.8 In a very
interesitng and curious case, Piggly Wiggly Delaware Inc. v.
Bartlett," the promoters issued to themselves all of the shares of
no par value. The promoters had the corporation sell the shares
under the guise of treasury stock, but the proceeds were turned
over to the promoters. It was held that the promoters were not
liable to the corporation, although, if the shares had had a par
value, the court said that a different question would have arisen.
Without doubt this case should have fallen within the perview of
the Massachusetts rule-this was merely a clever device to mis-
lead those on the outside. But, aside from this criticism, it is hard
to see how the no par feature of these shares could make any differ-
ence. There is the same possibility for overvaluation whether they
be par or no par value shares. The nominal value of shares is
utterly immaterial; the real value of the shares is their intrinsic,
actual, or proprietary value.
With this general background in mind, the Washington ease
may be discussed chronologically. The first case that arose, Inland
Nursery and Floral Co. v. Rice, 0 seems to be the leading case in
this state, since it is quoted and relied on most frequently in the
later opinions. The question arose on a demurrer to the corpora-
tion's complaint praying for a cancellation of shares fraudulently
exchanged by the promoters for property taken at an overvalua-
BALLANTInE, op. cit. supra, § 50 at 176-7.
11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS, § 194 at 628-9.
'85 A. L. R. 1263; B.kIANnNr, op. cit. supra, note 3, § 50 at 185.
'A. L. R. 1289-93; BALLANTINE, Op. cit. supra, note 3, § 50 at 186-8.
'97 N. J. Eq. 469, 129 At. 413 (1925).
1057 Wash. 67, 106 Pac. 499 (1910).
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tion. In sustaining the demurrer, the court used the following sig-
nificant language, which the later cases quote freely :
". .. there is no sufficient allegation of facts . .. it
does not appear but that subsequent stockholders pur-
chased with full opportunity for investigation into the
condition and assets of the company, and that the stock
they purchased was fully worth the sum paid therefor."
This statement stresses the fact that recovery can not be ob-
tained without proof of damage; and also that subsequent share-
holders have knowledge of the overvaluation-a factor which only
a Bigelow jurisdiction would consider. However, in the scope of
the opinion, the court said :12
"The appellant here having placed its own valuation on
the property at the time of the transfer for its stock,
cannot now complain upon the ground of an overvalua-
tion. "
This language sounds very much like the Lewisohn case, and, in
fact, the court quoted from the Lewisohn case in a different portion
of the opinion. But the case certainly cannot be considered authority
for the U. S. view, because the only question actually decided was
one of sufficiency of the pleadings.
In the next case, Eureka Mining, Smelting & Power Co. v.
Lively, 3 the promoters paid for their shares with property, and
then had the corporation use the proceeds of treasury stock to
"repay" the promoters for the money they exnended in purchas-
ing the property. This, of course, was flagrantly fraudulent, be-
cause it is contemplated that money received for treasury stock
becomes an asset of the corporation; accordingly the corporation
recovered. The Washington court obviously did not have to resort
to the "secret profit" cases in arriving at this decision.
In the third case, Mangold v. Adrian Irrigation Co., 4 which
arose on a demurrer to the evidence, a promoter held land under
option, and contracted to sell the land to the corporation. The cor-
poration waited until the term of the option expired, and then
bought the land directly at a low figure. The promoter brought an
action against the corporation for fraud, and the court held for the
corporation on the sensible ground that the promoter was a trustee
and owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation. The court "bol-
stered" its decision by citing the Lewisohn and Inland Nursery
cases, which do not seem to be in point.
In the fourth case, Kennedy Drug Co. v. Keyes, 5 the promoter
turned in no property at all for his shares, and it was held that
the promoter cannot keep his shares and that a receiver should be
appointed. This holding was correctly based on the fiduciary duty
of the promoter, and the flagrant fraud.
In the fifth case, Gold Ridge Mining and Development Co. v.
Rice, 6 a corporation was organized with 300,000 shares of stock,
111d. at 69, 106 Pac. at 499.
"Id. at 70, 106 Pac. at 500.
"59 Wash. 550, 110 Pac. 425 (1910).
"60 Wash. 286, 111 Pac. 173 (1910).
"1'60 Wash. 337, 111 Pac. 175 (1910).
1"77 Wash. 384, 137 Pac. 1001 (1914).
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and 100,000 shares were given to each of two promoters in return
for their overvalued property. In an action by the promoters
against the corporation to recover the proceeds of 7,000 shares
sold by the corporation's secretary-treasurer with the consent of
the corporation, and retained by the corporation under an agree-
ment allowing the promoter to draw against it, the promoter re-
covered. The case went through a full trial, and on its facts, it is,
without question, squarely in accord with the Lewisohn case,
since there were 100,000 authorized shares not issued to the pro-
moters, who undoubtedly contemplated having this stock issued
in the future. The court used Lewisohn language when it said :
"The appellant and Hammer [the promoters] were on
both sides of the bargain. The respondent was also rep-
resented by its third trustee. No one was -wronged and no
rule of public policy was violated. The holders of the bond
(the overvalued property) knew what they were selling,
and the respondent knew precisely what it was buying.
The deal was made in the open, and the transaction was
valid as between the parties."
The case is, of couse, incomplete in analysis, for this quotation
constitutes the court's entire discussion upon this point. Also, it
will be seen that the court quotes the Inland Nursery case for
authority when, in fact, as already shown, that case is authority
for a pleading question only. Furthermore, the court failed to
mention the important factor of contemplated future innocent
shareholders.
In the sixth case, Eggleston v. Pantages,18 the result reached
was orthodox, but the means of reaching it were superficial. D pro-
nioted a corpokation and subscribed for all the shares and paid for
it with property. Subsequently, P bought some shares from D, and
then brought this action alleging failure by D to pay for his shares.
The court held for D, mainly on the basis of the Inland Nursery
case. How the Inland Nursery case, which, doctrinely, involved an
action by a corporation, and, besides, was decided on the pleadings,
can serve as precedent for this suit by a purchaser of shares from
the promoter, seems rather incredible. Of course, it is conceded
that from the court's language, a dictum, in the Inland Nursery
case, quoted above, the result here is justifiable. The law generally
distinguishes sharply between the corporation and the individual
shareholder bringing the action, and different principles, broadly
speaking, are applied to each situation. 9 Individual shareholders
may maintain actions against a promoter of a corporation to recover
for individual frauds as contrasted with frauds on the corporation.
In the seventh case, Shaw v. Car?,20 the promoters took all the
shares in return for their property, and then turned some back
to the corporation as treasury stock, so that working capital could
be raised. P, a purchaser of the treasury stock, brought an action
against the promoter to rescind their subscription, and to get a
'lid. at 387, 137 Pac. at 1002.1593 Wash. 221, 160 Pac. 425 (1916).
'"BALLANTiNE, op. cit. supra, note 3, § 51 at 192; PLETCHER, OP. Cit.
supra, note 6, § 196.
93 Wash: 550, 161 Pac. 345 (1916).
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return of the consideration paid the corporation, on the ground
that the property paid into the corporation by the promoters was
worthless. In another highly superficial opinion, the court held for
D. The court again failed to state concisely that this case was a suit
by an individual shareholder, as distinguished from the corpora-
tion, and cited the Inland Nursery case again as direct authority.
At the same time, the court made a very unfortunate, though far-
reaching statement:
"To measure the value of such a contract is exceedingly
difficult. For that reason, we have followed the rule where
the facts invite it, of Old Dominion Copper Mining &
Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn."
In the eighth case, Ennis v. New World Life Insurance Co.,21
the promoter took a stock purchase warrant in organizing the
corporation, and when the shares passed par, attempted to enforce
it against the corporation. In holding for the corporationn, in a
well reasoned opinion, the court stressed the fiduciary nature of
the promoter, the fraud, and the public policy involved in in-
surance.
In the ninth case, Colville Valley Coal Co. v. Rogers,22 in a
situation involving the Dominion cases' question, the promoters
turned property over to the P corporation, for 95% of the shares.
The corporation and subsequent stockholders joined in an action
against the promoters, and it was held for the promoters. The
court, although distinguishing between the action of the corpora-
tion and the subsequent shareholders, again cited the Inland
Nursery case in support of their holding against all of the plain-
tiffs, and also cited the Golden Ridge case against the corporation.
This case, like the In 7and Nursery case, cannot be considered as
direct authority, for it arose on a demurrer to P's evidence.
The tenth case was Metcalfe v. Mental Science Industrial Ass'n.23
This was an action against the promoters by the purchaser of
shares from the promoter, who had obtained these particular shares
by turning property over to the corporation; it was held for the
promoter. The court cited the Lewisohn, Inland Nursery, Gold
Ridge, and Colville Valley cases.
In the final case, Connor v. Robinson,24 decided on the pleadings,
the promoter subscribed to all the shares and then turned about
one-half back to the corporation to be sold as treasury stock. The
case involved an action by a receiver to recover from the promoters
in order to pay off creditors, so that any statements relative to
the solvent corporation's recourse against the promoters would
be dicta. The court did indulge in a dictum, and stated that the
corporation would not be able to recover from the promoters, and
cited only the Inland Nursery and Colville Valley cases, the two
cases decided on the pleadings. It should also be noticed that the
court overlooked the treasury stock feature here, which was dis-
cussed in the fifth class of cases supra.
" 97 Wash. 122, 165 Pac. 1091 (1917).
2123 Wash. 360, 212 Pac. 732 (1923).
11127 Wash. 50, 220 Pac. 1 (1923).
11137 Wash. 672, 243 Pac. 849 (1926).
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A review of these Washington cases will reveal that the only
class of cases, outlined above, directly passesd upon in Washington
is the Dominion type of case; that there is an indirect holding on
the treasury stock situation; that flagrant fraud will not be toler-
ated; and that the promoter owes a fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion. Unfortunately, by an explicit statement, numerous dicta, and
a direct holding in the Gold Ridge case, Washington seems lined up
with the Lewisohn case. But since the cases as a whole contain
little elaboration and discussion, especially of the conflicting poli-
cies and interests involved, it is hoped that the Washington court
will allow this question to be reopened, with the consequent result
of a turning over to the more desirable Massachusetts, Bigelow view.
MAUtiC Gxasnox.
COMPETENCY OF PROOF OF "CUSTOMARY" NEGLI-
GENCE IN SUPPORT OF CHARGE OF SPECIFIC
ACT OF NEGLIGENCE
It is no doubt accurate to say that the bar of this state has here-
tofore assumed (and justifiably so, in view of prior decisions of
the court) that, generally speaking, a specific charge of negligence
(e.g. excessive speed) may not be established by proof of prior
or similar acts of negligence, nor even by proof of customary or
habitual negligence of the same sort. Consequently, the opinion of
the Washington Supreme Court in Sheddy v. Inland Motor
Freight,' is of more than passing interest.
The case involved a head-on collision between the automobile in
which the plaintiff was riding and a truck owned and operated by
the defendant. Negligence was predicated, among other things,
upon an allegation of excessive speed. As corroborative of plain-
tiff's own direct testimony on the noint, he offered testimony to
the effect that defendant's fleet of trucks was engaged in trans-
porting steel from the railroad at Coulee City to the dam; that
the steel was hauled on a tonnage basis, and that the compensation
of defendant's drivers depended, in part, at least, upon the mileage
which each made; that approximately five loads were transported
each day, and that "more or less of a schedule had to be main-
tained on each trip, in order to obtain efficient results" for the
defendant and for its drivers.
Evidence was also offered as to the speed capacity of the truck
in question, the time "regularly" required to drive the truck, load-
ed as it was on this occasion, "from terminus to terminus, or from
junction to junction, and the nature of the road as to curves
grades and straight-aways."
All of this testimony ivas admitted by the trial court, and in
affirming the judgment, the Washington Supreme Court found the
evidence relevant and competent as "creating a background fro 5
which the inference could be drawn that, on a straight-away with
a down grade, a speed of fifty miles per hour or thereabouts would
be customary", and that the testimony "tended rather strongly to
189 Wash. Dec. 41, 68 P. (2d) 430 (1936).
